Concerns over the re-distributive effects of individual transferable quotas (ITQ's) have led to restrictions on their tradability. We consider a general equilibrium model with firm dynamics to evaluate the redistributive impact of changing the tradability of ITQs. A change in tradability would happen, for example, if permits are allowed to be traded as a separate asset from ownership of an active firm. If the property right is associated with ownership of an active firm, the permit can be leased in each period but it is not possible to exit the industry and keep the right. However, allowing the permits to be traded as a separate asset has two effects. First, it leads to a greater concentration of production in the industry. Second, it directly converts a non-tradable asset into a tradable one, and this is equivalent to giving a lump sum transfer to all firms. The first effect implies a concentration in revenues, while the second implies a redistribution of wealth. We calibrate our model to match the observed increase in revenue inequality in the Northeast Multispecies (Groundfish) U.S. Fishery. We show that although observed revenue inequality -measured by the Gini coefficient-increases by 12%, wealth inequality is reduced by 40%.
Introduction
A crucial question in environmental and resource economics is why tradable output permits are not more widely adopted as a solution for environmental problems. The consensus appears to be that equity concerns are one important reason for the reluctance to use individual transferable quotas (ITQs) more widely.
1 In particular, the literature argues that the efficiency gains associated with tradable quotas will not be captured by small firms.
2
These distributional concerns lead to restrictions in tradability of output permits, implying incompleteness of the right. For instance, in fisheries regulated with ITQs, if the property right is associated with ownership of an active eligible vessel the permit can be leased in each period but it is not possible to exit the fishery and keep the right. If the property right is assigned instead to the owner of the vessel and divorced from ownership of an active vessel, it could actually be traded as a separate asset and constitute a complete property right.
We show that a reform consisting of allowing the permits to be traded as a separate asset has two effects. On one hand, it leads to a greater concentration of production in the industry, as the most efficient firms will produce more. Second, it directly converts a non-tradable asset into a tradable one. This is equivalent to giving a lump sum transfer to all firms. The first effect implies a concentration in revenues, while the second implies a redistribution of wealth.
We consider a model of firm dynamics that builds on Weninger and Just (2002) , Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and Da-Rocha et al. (2014a) . Firms are heterogeneous, but in contrast with the standard framework their distribution is not exogenous but rather determined endogenously by entry/exit decisions made by firms themselves.
1 See Brandt (2005) . 2 In fisheries, for instance, there is an extensive literature on the relationship between tradability of ITQs and consolidation. See, for instance, Grafton et al. (2000) , Fox et al. (2003) , Kompas and Nu (2005) among others. There is also literature arguing that efficiency gains will be captured only by larger producers. See, for example Libecap (2007) or Olson (2011) .
We extend the model in Weninger and Just (2002) 's to a general equilibrium framework. The definition of a stationary equilibrium in a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents requires an invariant distribution of firms which is determined by agents' optimal policies, and also determines the agents' optimal choices. We use the Kolmogorov-FokkerPlanck equation to find that distribution.
3 We use the model to investigate the impact of changing the tradability of property rights on wealth distributions. The change in transferability affects entry/exit decisions, and also wealth distributions, which are endogenous in the economic environment.
The Northeast Multispecies (Groundfish) U.S. fishery provides a good numerical example to illustrate the model. In 2010, a new management program implemented two significant changes: first, permits were allowed to participate in Leasing and Transfer Programs without being activated by being placed onto a vessel and second, several constraints imposed on trade were removed. We calibrate our model to match the observed increase in revenue inequality in that fishery after the reform and then use the model to compute the resulting unobserved change in wealth inequality. Our simulations show that when the property right is assigned to a person and 3 The Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck equation is widely used to describe population dynamics in ecology, biology, and finance, among other sciences. It has been used in economics by Merton (1975) in neoclassical growth models, by Dixit and Pindyck (1984) in a renewable resources model and by Da-Rocha and Pujolas (2011b) in fisheries. The use of Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck equation to characterize the distribution of firms was suggested by Dixit and Pindyck (1994) . There is a growing literature on general equilibrium models with heterogeneous firms that uses the Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck equation to characterize the equilibrium invariant distribution of firms as in Luttmer (2007) , Da-Rocha and Pujolas (2011a), Luttmer (2011 ), Luttmer (2012 , Impullitti et al. (2013) , Gourio and Roys (2014) , Da-Rocha et al. (2014a) , Da-Rocha et al. (2014b) and Da-Rocha et al. (2015) , among others. Two good surveys are Gabaix (2009) and Luttmer (2010) . divorced from the ownership of an active vessel, transferability of ITQs squeezes out small vessels but efficiency gains can also be captured through increases in the lease price for small owners by leasing quota, and wealth inequality is reduced by 40%.
Our paper is also related to the literature on the distributional implications of alternative market-based control mechanisms. The "mechanism" that generates redistribution in our model is supported by the empirical findings of Brandt (2007) . Furthermore, we are also able to show that wealth distribution among fishermen would actually improve with tradability.
Because it computes how differences in the transferability of property rights affect market outcomes, the paper is also related to Gomez-Lobo et al. (2011) , Grainger and Costello (2014) and Grainger and Costello (2015) . A key difference between these papers and ours is that we compute the full wealth distribution, which is an endogenous object in our model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the economic environment.
In Section 3 we characterize the equilibrium of the model and solve the closed form for the stationary distribution of firms' wealth. Section 4 calibrates the model with data from the US Northeast Multispecies Fishery, and finally Section 5 assesses the impacts of introducing free transferability into wealth distribution.
The Economic Environment
Assume a natural resource industry that is managed with tradable output permits q, where firms must own permits to exploit the resource legally. Total quota is determined exogenously, and for the sake of simplicity we normalize it to 1.
There are four markets in the economy: final goods, labor, an output permit lease market where trade takes place between incumbent firms, and a permit market where trade takes place between entrants and exiting firms. Taking output price as the numeraire, we denote by w, r q and p q , the labor, quota lease and quota ownership prices, respectively.
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We assume that all firms are ex-ante identical. However they are ex-post differentiated by a firm specific shock to production which is drawn from a distribution function g(c).
6 We assume that the entry problem produces two decision rules: one for the optimal choice of the number of quotas, and, the other for the optimal entry decision. That is, firms choose how many quotas to hold and, at the same time, decide whether to enter the fishery. They decide to enter by assessing the expected value of operating a unit of capital (a vessel). Entry is costly and its cost is valued in terms of labor services, so if a firm decides to enter c e w has to be paid. If W (c) denotes the value of operating a vessel when the shock is c and, c * , the entry threshold, the expected value of entry can be expressed as:
After entry, entrants become incumbents.
Although we are interested in the stationary competitive equilibrium distribution of firms, note that individual firms change over time. Some of them expand production, hiring staff and borrowing quotas; others contract production, firing staff and leasing out quotas; and others exit the industry and sell their quotas. Therefore, the incumbent firms' decision problem produces two types of decision rule. On one hand, there are continuous decision rules for the optimal choice of output y(c), labor l(c) and the net demand for quotas (i.e.
the number of quotas leased) y(c) − q, and, on the other hand, there is a discrete decision rule d(c) for the optimal stay/exit decision.
We also assume that there is a fixed operating cost of c f . If a firm wants to remain active then it must pay the fixed cost. The decision to exit depends on this period's employment l(c), output y(c), and permit leasing decisions y(c) − q. Conditional on this period's choices, 5 We do not consider many other types of distortion or other issues that could appear when regulating the environment with output permits. Examples of such distortions include imperfect enforcement as in Chavez and Salgado Cabrera (2005) and Hansen et al. (2014) ; international price externalities as in Burguet and Sempere (2010) ; transboundary resources as Garza-Gil (1998) ; distributional deadweight losses as in Thompson (2013) ; market power in intertemporal settings as in Armstrong (2008) ; and joint-ownership fishing exploitation as Escapa and Prellezo (2003) .
6 This is a standard assumption in models with firm dynamics. See Hopenhayn (1992) , Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) or Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) . 
Equilibrium
We consider a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms. First we solve the model when ITQs are permanent and fully tradable. This could be interpreted as the ITQ being dissociated from ownership of an active vessel, i.e. this is the case in which quotas can be leased for the current period but also permanently transferred without owning an active
vessel. Later, we analyze the case in which ITQs can be leased for a given period but must to be associated with an active vessel.
The problem of incumbent firms
Firms maximize profits subject to their available technology, y = l c . Note that we extend the model in Weninger and Just (2002) to a world in which quotas are a continuous variable and firms can lease part of their quota. 7 Also notice that when a firm chooses y, it is also implicitly choosing the net demand for quotas. Thus, intra-temporal profits are given by
That is, profits are defined as output, y, minus labor costs, wl, plus net revenue from leasing quotas, r q (q − y), minus the fixed operating cost, c f . From the f.o.c. we have,
, and profits are given by
where π(w, r q ) =
. Now the inter-temporal decision making of firms can be assessed. As in Weninger and Just (2002) , we assume that the productivity shock c follows a geometric Brownian motion 7 Our technology is in accordance with the fifty-fifty rule, i.e. 50% of net revenues are accounted for by payments to crew members. stochastic process with a positive expected growth rate, µ, i.e.
where σ is the per-unit time volatility, and dz is the random increment to a Weiner process.
Each firm has to weigh up its current and future potential profits against the benefits of selling its quota. Formally
where (1 + ρdt) −1 is the discount factor, EW (c + dc) are the expected future profits, and pare the benefits of selling the permits and exiting the market. It is important to notice that in the competitive equilibrium all firms, regardless of their cost or productivity, sell their quotas at the same competitive price. That is, the price of quotas is independent of idiosyncratic characteristics. Finally, note that the value matching and smooth pasting conditions at the switching point c * where firms choose to exit are W (c * ) = pand W (c * ) = 0, respectively.
8
The value function, W (c), is obtained by solving the following ordinary second-order differential equation.
with boundary conditions W (c * ) = pand W (c * ) = 0. Proposition 1 characterizes the value function and the switching point.
8 See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) Chapter 4 for a formal definition and justification of these conditions. Proposition 1. The exit threshold, c * , and the value function, W (c), are given by
and
σ 2 > 1 is the root of the standard quadratic equation associated with the geometric Brownian motion.
Proof See Appendix A.1.
Invariant distribution of firms
For prices to be calculated the distribution of firms must be computed. In our economy, the distribution of firms is determined endogenously by entry/exit decisions made by firms themselves. To find that distribution we start by rewriting the model in logarithms, i.e. x = log(c/c * ), and apply the the Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov equation
of the stochastic process dx =μdt + σdz, where M (x, t) is the mass of firms over the variable x, εM (x, t) represents the new firms that enter with productivity x at time t, andμ = µ−
The partial differential equation is supplemented by the boundary condition M (0, t) = 0.
This boundary condition guarantees that the mass of firms at the boundary, where firms decide to leave, is zero.
We are interested in the steady state distribution with a constant mass of firms, M (x, t) = M f (x). Therefore the Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov equation becomes
The stationary pdf is the solution of the boundary-value problem that consists of solving the following second order differential equation:
where the constants γ 1 and γ 2 are given by γ 1 = Proof See Appendix A.2.
We solve the boundary-value problem using Laplace transforms.
10 Applying Laplace transforms to the second order differential equation, we have
Using γ 2 1 = 4γ 2 and the boundary condition, we find:
where r =μ σ 2 > 0. We obtain the solution by solving the Laplace inverses, L −1 , given by
Note that f (x) is bounded and well defined. The distribution is stationary because the stochastic effect compensates the deterministic drift effect. Although c increases in expected terms given enough time, some of the firms are lucky and c decreases.
Moreover at the limit, firms do not leave the distribution. The exit rate at
11 At the lower bound, −∞, the exit rate is zero. That is, x = −∞ is a natural reflecting barrier. The distribution is only loosing firms at x = 0, because firms find optimal to leave the industry. Therefore, an endogenous pdf can be found without imposing an exogenous reflecting barrier. 12 Finally, using c = c * e x , we recover the stationary cost distribution. Proposition 3 summarizes our findings.
Proposition 3. The invariant distribution of firms is g(c)
Note the measures used in the report about the performance of the Northeast Multispecies fishery include the Lorenz curves of revenue 13 . It must be remarked that Lorenz curves are well defined for infinite support just as the equilibrium distribution of firms in our model is.
14 11 See Appendix A.2. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) offers an intuitive argument.
12 With an exogenous reflecting barrier, the solution would be a bounded Pareto distribution. In fact, if it is assumed that c ⊂ [c, c * ] with an exogenous reflecting barrier at c, the solution can be obtained by solving a two-boundary value problem. However this solution would depend on the (exogenous) reflecting barrier imposed.
13 See Kitts et al. (2011) . 14 Infinite support is standard in wealth studies. Heterogeneity in wages is assumed to be Log-normal distributed (with infinite support). Other empirical studies use statistics based on distributions with infinite supports. For example, Zwip's low (applied to cities, landscape, etc.) is based on GBM with infinite supports.
Problem of entrants
Given the value function W (c), the gross value of entry W e can be computed by using g(c).
That is
Potential entrants choose the number of quotas by solving
Notice that since entrants are ex-ante identical they all choose the same value for q. Entrants decide to enter if W e > 0 for the chosen q. The result below provides a non arbitrage condition relating the price of permanently selling an ITQ to the leasing price. It implies equivalence between selling the permit and leasing it for an infinite number of periods.
Proposition 4. In an equilibrium with exit, the no-arbitrage condition p q = rq ρ
holds.
Proof See Appendix A.3.
Finally, notice that in an equilibrium with entry W e must be zero, since otherwise additional firms would enter.
Feasibility conditions
To close the model we need to define feasibility conditions. Feasibility in the model requires resource balance in the output market, the leasing quota market and the labor market. By normalizing the total quota at 1, it results that feasibility in the output market is given by M q = 1. Feasibility in the leasing ITQ market implies that the aggregate excess demand
Finally, equilibrium in the labor market implies that
where the total labor supply is normalized to 1, and εM c e , the entry cost multiplied by the mass of entrants, is the labor force allocated to produce the entry cost.
Definition of equilibrium
A stationary equilibrium is an invariant cost distribution g(c), a mass of firms M , a number of permits q, permit prices p q and r q , wage rate w, incumbents and entrants value functions W (c), W e , individual decision rules l(c), y(c), π(c) and a threshold c * , such that: i) (Firm optimization) Given prices (r q , p q , w), the entry functions, and W (c) and W e solve incumbent and entrant problems, l(c), y(c) , π(c) are optimal policy functions and and c * is the threshold associated with the optimal exit rule.
ii) (Free-entry and optimal quota) Potential entrants choose quotas q and make zero profits, i.e. W e = 0.
iii) (non-arbitrage condition) p q = r q ρ .
iv) (Market clearing-feasibility) Given individual decision rules, prices (r q , p q , w) solve
Note that the definition of equilibrium is similar to the standard definition in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) . The main difference is that Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) consider a discrete time model.
However, obvious equivalences appear. In fact, assuming Brownian motion is equivalent to assuming an AR(1) stochastic process, and the Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck equation is the continuous time version of the (endogenous) discrete Markovian chain.
Equilibrium when quotas are not fully tradable
In some fisheries distribution and other concerns have led to limits being placed on the trading of quotas. These limits on transferability can be implemented in many different ways. For example, Arnason (2002) Consider the case where quotas must be associated with an active vessel. 16 In that case, one must own an eligible vessel to own a quota. As in the fully transferable case, there is an equilibrium at which some extremely unproductive vessels exit permanently, and some intermediate vessels fish the minimum amount required for them to be considered active, and lease the (remaining) quota if lease prices are high enough to justify paying the idling (or storage, or minimum activity) costs. That is, once one has an eligible vessel one can obtain revenues from leasing one's quota.
In the limited transferability case a permanent transfer of the quota should include the cost of the quota and the cost of the boat. That is, the price of the "package" is the expected value of operating the boat, W (c). The question then is what the relevant "exit option" is when the quota is tied to an eligible vessel. The "net" option of the exiting party is the benefit from leaving the market when productivity is so low that the revenues from leasing the quota do not justify paying the idling (or storage, or minimum activity) costs. That is, the equilibrium is the limit case of the full transferable case when p q → 0. Thus firms solve the following optimization problem
in which the profits from operating a vessel are contrasted with the value of exiting the industry (which is normalized to zero). 17 There is a cost, c * , for which owners find it optimal to exit the industry.
Corollary 1. When p q = 0, c * and W (c) are given by
Summarizing, there is a key difference between the lessor of quotas in the limited transferability case and the lessor of quotas in the non limited transferability case. With permanent transferability, the landlord of the quota can rent the whole quota as it does not need to be included in the group of vessels that makes at least one trip per year. This is the type of landlord reported by Brandt (2007) : they are quota owners who choose to cease harvesting.
However, in the case of non permanent transferability the lessor of quotas must necessarily be included in the group of vessels that makes at least one trip per year, and therefore has to incur the cost of idling.
The Northeast Multispecies (Groundfish) Fishery
The 
Calibration
We start the calibration by matching the Lorenz curves associated with the Gini coefficients reported in the 2010 Groundfish Final Report.
GBM process and Revenue Lorenz curves:
The Lorenz curve plots the cumulative proportion of revenues as a function of the cumulative proportion of active vessels. The invariant distribution for the revenue of active vessels, y(w, r q , c) = 1 − r q 2w c −1 , generated 21 The rationality of this measure is explained as Removing the cap will facilitate effective use of the leasing program and will provide the ability for some vessels to acquire enough DAS to be profitable. To calibrate the GBM parameters we use the property of the model which states that in the stationary equilibrium the tail index of the cost distribution ξ is a function of µ and σ. As is well known, the area between the Lorenz curve and the (equal income) straight line is the Gini coefficient.
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We were unable to find data to compute the vessel lifespan for the Northeast Multispecies (Groundfish) Fishery, so we calibrate the vessel lifespan to match the value of the drift estimated by Weninger and Just (2002) in 2007. 29 The other GBM parameters that match the Lorenz curve can be computed using propositions 2 and 3. That is, the process µ and σ is chosen by minimizing the distance of the Lorenz curve generated by the model to the one 25 CDF of revenue are characterized in Appendix A.4.
26 Appendix A.7 shows the relationship between Lorenz curves and CDF's via a simple example. 27 That is, we want to choose ξ and y * so that the revenue Lorenz curve generated by our F (y) is the closest to the revenue Lorenz curve generated by the data.
28 Note that a Lorenz curve always starts at (0,0) and ends at (1,1), independently of the support of the variable.
29 Weninger and Just (2002) assumed that c is the unit operating cost. This unit operating cost is assumed to be distributed over a bounded support [c, c * ). Therefore, the GBM process (µ and σ) and the support, c, can be estimated using average variable cost data. They use a sample of 22 vessels from the Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery to estimate µ = 0.04, σ 2 = 0.16 and c * 0 = .62. 
32
It is important to notice that the reduction in the drift parameter (from 0.0431 to 0.0400) 30 The support of the distribution is given by the size of c * , which is endogenous in the model. They find that the abandonment cost threshold is c * = 5.57, 278% greater than the cost of the most efficient vessel. They set the price at 7.60. Therefore, the size of the revenue, p−c, support is equal to (7.60−0.62)/(7.60−5.57) 344%.
31 The 2007 and 2010 Lorenz curves were obtained using data from 658 and 450 vessels, respectively. 32 This is consistent with the empirical evidence. For example Morrison Paul et al. (2009) found significant growth in economic productivity after a property rights-based management reform. (y%) of the total revenues is accounted for by the bottom x% of vessels. The percentage of vessels is plotted on the x-axis, and the percentage of revenues on the y-axis. As is well known, the area between the Lorenz curve and the (equal income) straight line is the Gini coefficient. The higher the coefficient, the more unequal the distribution is.
could be interpreted as an increase in efficiency due to the removal of restrictions on leasing quotas. This increase in efficiency can be rationalized, at least partially, as the result of having more complete markets that foster investment in more efficient production processes.
Other parameters: Given the GBM process, it is necessary to calibrate three parameters c f , c e and ρ. 33 We start by selecting a value of the annual interest rate ρ = 0.04 which is standard for the US economy in macroeconomic literature. 34 We calibrate the other two parameters by solving the equilibrium of the model and making sure the equilibrium statistics match statistics from the fishery. In particular, we calibrate the entry cost c e and the fixed cost to match the reduction observed in the number of active vessels between 2007 and 2010, 33 The formulas used for c f and c e are given in Appendix A5, and the formulas used to compute the model equilibrium are given in Appendix A6.
34 See, for instance Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) .
and the leasing quota prices in 2010. 35 Finally, the TAC is normalized to 1 so that in each year q = 1/M . The parameter values are summarized in Table 3 . Table 4 shows the equilibria generated with the parameters. The model reduces the abandonment threshold by 31% to match the fleet squeeze. The average cost, c = cg(c)dc, is reduced by 50%. In our model c −1 is a TFP shifter that can not be estimated directly from the data. But there is indirect evidence of these efficiency gains. For example, average trip costs per day for vessels between 50' and < 75' fell by 26% between 2007 and 2010 and TFP measures for vessels affected by the regulatory changes were up by 12%. 36 Moreover, observe that active firms are more productive and demand more than one permit (as q = 1.4622).
Finally, the equilibrium quota price is 10.00.
35 See Kitts et al. (2011) 
Wealth Distribution
We quantify the impact of allowing participation in the Leasing and Transfer Programs without the requirement of owning an active vessel on firm value and wealth distribution by comparing these statistics for 2010, (when quotas were attached to vessel owners) with the equivalent statistics for 2007 (when quotas were attached to vessels).
In both economies the value of the firms, W (c), includes the value of the vessel (the capital) and the value of the quota. 37 In both economies some less productive active firms (vessels) lease part of the quota, i.e. q − y(c) > 0.
The key differences between these economies are related to the number of assets in each one.
When the property right is attached to the vessel there is only one asset in the economy: the vessel with the attached permit to operate in the industry. Firms operate capital and stay active if they find it optimal to pay the idling cost, c f . Note that the marginal firm (the less efficient vessel) is indifferent between paying the idling cost to fish the minimum amount to be considered active, y(c * ), which enables it to lease the remaining quota, q − y(c * ), and exiting the market. This marginal firm makes negative instantaneous profits and the total expected value of operating the vessel is zero. Therefore, if the marginal active firm decides to leave the market, it obtains this value, W (c * ) = 0. Figure 3 shows that allowing total transferability of quotas shifts the value function upwards via the exit constraint W (c) ≥ p. It also shows that increasing the value of exiting changes the incentives to exit.
When the property right is attached to the owner of the vessel and divorced from ownership of an active vessel it can be traded as a separate asset. Active firms can decide to cease activities and become a lessors of quotas if they find it optimal to (permanently) lease their quotas. The marginal firm (the least efficient vessel) is indifferent between paying the idling 37 Note that, as in Weninger and Just (2002) , firms are operating one unit of capital. cost to fish the minimum amount required for it to be considered active y(c * ), which allows it to lease the remaining quota, q − y(c * ), and permanently leasing its quota without paying the idling cost. Note that when firms are allowed to lease quotas without being active the marginal firm becomes more efficient.
38 Moreover, by allowing active vessels to trade quotas as a separate asset the value of the active firms is increased. If the marginal active firm decides to cease its activity it obtains the value of selling the right, W (c * ) = p, without paying the idle cost. Figure 3 shows the impact of changes in efficiency (in the abandonment threshold) on cost distribution and on the value functions.
We are interested in exploring the distributional impact of these changes. We divide the section into three parts. First, we study the impact on the value of active firms. More precisely, we show that by raising the value at the margin, the change in transferability generates a redistributive effect which is similar to giving a fixed transfer to each firm.
Second, we construct the wealth distribution for the whole economy: including the inactive quota owners and the active firms; and third, we compare the impact of (potential) changes in innovation rates on wealth distribution. Table 5 represents the wealth distribution of active firms in 2007 and 2010. For instance, the numbers under "bottom 5%" represent the proportion of the total wealth that goes to the poorest 5% of the active firms and the numbers under the quartiles represent the amount of wealth that goes to the corresponding quartile.
The effect of a lump sum transfer on active firms
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In 2007 the model generates more inequality in wealth than in income. That is, the Gini coefficient of the wealth distribution (0.88) is higher than the Gini coefficient of income 38 It is clear that a firm which is fishing the "minimum" to be considered active y(c * ) → 0, finds it optimal to lease its quota without paying the idle cost, rather than paying the idling cost to lease the quota. 39 We compute the wealth distribution by using W (c) and f (c) for each economy. 42 Note also that firms at the bottom are very poor. This is because they are obtaining negative profits and waiting for better times.
43 Table 5 shows that wealth distribution in 2010 is less concentrated. This reduction in inequality comes from the exit condition, which implies W (c) ≥ p, which in turn implies that with permanent transferable quotas the marginal firm has a positive value. That is, giving full transferability to fishing rights is equivalent to giving a lump sum transfer (of the same amount) to all firms in the market independently of their wealth levels. This reduces inequality as the hypothetical transfer to the poorer firms is larger in proportion to their original wealth than that given to the richer ones.
Consider an example to explain the impact of a lump sum transfer on the Gini coefficient and the Lorenz curve. The example shows that this redistributive mechanism reduces the Gini coefficient. Consider an economy with 3 agents and an initial endowment of W 0 = [0 5 10].
That is, agent 1 has zero wealth, agent 2 has 5 units and agent 3 has 10 units of wealth. Table 6 shows that the Gini coefficient is 0.44 before the transfer and 0.22 after the transfer. Moreover, if the Lorenz curves of these two economies are plotted a transfer of these characteristics shifts the Lorenz curve to the right. there is a new class of quota landlords who decide to cease activity but lease their quotas. Table 7 compares total wealth changes.
Wealth distribution for quota owners
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The model predicts that firms that cease activities (31.64% in Table 7 ) are the least efficient 44 We computed wealth distribution in 2010 by using
in the 2007 economy. In the 2010 economy, they find it optimal to cease activities and permanently lease their ITQs at a price p q (10.00). The wealth of these small owners is therefore multiplied by 500. In the same table, the top 5% represents the most efficient, which own many quotas. Their wealth is therefore multiplied by a factor of less than 10.
Therefore, total wealth is less concentrated than the wealth of active vessels.
Wealth and innovation rate
The experiments described below explore the impact of higher innovation rates on the wealth inequality calculated by our model. 45 We expect that better functioning markets, with more complete and transferable property rights, foster innovation. Table 8 reports Gini coefficients for active and total owners, and the percentage of exiting firms for four different levels of µ.
Notice that if more tradability of ITQs generates an increase in the innovation rate this is a force for increasing the level of inequality. In our model, in order to generate more inequality than in the case with restricted tradability (remember that in that case the Gini coefficient was 0.88), the innovation rate must increase by 50% (compared to the innovation rate of just 6% suggested by the data), which would be associated with a fleet shrinkage of around 90%. 
Conclusions
Much of the reluctance to use individual transferable quotas in the US is due to the concern that ITQs will change participants' relative positions in the fishery and, in particular, to the fear that small-scale fishermen will be disadvantaged relative to larger producers. However Brandt (2005) shows that in the US mid-Atlantic clam fishery no segment of the industry was disproportionately adversely affected by the regulatory change. In this paper we build a formal model that supports these findings. Moreover, we find that allowing fully transferable rights is equivalent to giving a lump sum transfer (of the same amount) to all firms in the market which is independent of their wealth level. This reduces inequality as the transfer to the poorer is larger in proportion to their original wealth than that to the richer.
In our model heterogeneity is generated by firm-specific shocks to production opportunities.
However, the same result could be achieved with other firm-specific shocks, e.g. differences in prices and demands driven by the composition of catches and/or quality. 46 In that case, perhaps a more precise statement of the results would be that if agent heterogeneity is high enough then trading of permits does not necessarily increase wealth inequality.
Finally, as in Weninger and Just (2002) we introduce capital as the static decision as to whether to buy a vessel (interpreted as consisting of a unit of capital). Given that our model is concerned with the stationary equilibrium we can abstract from capital dynamics.
47
However, capital dynamics are important for understanding transitions. 48 We leave this analysis for future research.
46 For instance, in Da-Rocha and Pujolas (2011a) heterogeneity comes by differences in the species composition of vessel catches.
47 Veracierto (2001) founds that capital is not important for understanding the stationary equilibrium. For this reason, the literature refrains from considering capital, or introduces it as a static decision.
48 See Lai (2007) and Hannesson (1996) .
Finally we use the boundary conditions
to obtain A 1 and c * . That is
Hence, the value function of an individual is
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Applying Laplace transforms in f (x) − γ 1 f (x) + γ 2 f (x) = 0, gives:
Using the boundary condition f (0) = 0 we find:
.
Note that γ 1 = 2μ σ 2 > 0 and γ 2 = 2ε σ 2 > 0 implies that only solutions with positive roots can exist. The solution depends on the number of (positive) roots of the equation s 2 − γ 1 s + γ 2 = 0. It is clear that from this equation, the solution must satisfy
There are then two possible solutions. One implies r 1 = r 2 = r and the other r 1 = r 2 = r. We prove that the first possibility cannot be a solution of our problem by contradiction. Consider a solution with two different roots, so that the discriminant γ 2 1 − 4γ 2 does not vanish, implying that γ 2 1 = 4γ 2 . With two different (positive) roots the solution of the second order differential equation becomes:
We obtain the solution by solving the Laplace inverses given by:
Note that f (0) = r 1 r 2 = 0, and this implies a contradiction.
Therefore, the solution satisfies r = r 1 = r 2 . This implies that γ 2 1 − 4γ 2 = 0, and that r i = 
A.4 Cumulative distribution function
Revenue y(w, r q , c) = 1 − r q 2w c −1 is non linear in c. However, the invariant distribution of revenue is a simple change in the power of the invariant cost distribution. That is, f (y) = − (α − 1) 2 y * y * y ξ+2 ln(y * /y).
We calculate 
A.7 The computation of Gini coefficients and Lorenz curve
In order to compute the Gini coefficients in our calibrations we use the approximation by trapezoids known as Brown's formula. Formally, define p(n) as the density and P (n) as the accumulated proportion of the population variable, forn = 0, with N being the types of individuals differentiated by wealth (and ordered from least to greatest wealth), with P (0) = 0 and P (N ) = 1. Define as w = 0....W the different wealth levels (where wealth is ordered in a non decreasing fashion) and let f (w) be the density and F (w) be the cumulative proportion of the wealth variable. The Gini coefficient can then be defined as
An application that measures the effect of a lump sum transfer on the Gini coefficient is presented in Table 9 . Column 1 is the amount transferred. Column 2 is the proportion of the population in each wealth level. Columns 3 and 4 are the wealth levels before and after the transfer, respectively. Column 5 represents the cumulaivte distribution of people and columns 6 and 7 the cumulative distribution of wealth before and after the transfer. The rest of the columns are helpful in computing Brown's formula. It is immediately apparent by straightforward application of the formula that the Gini coefficient is 0.44 before the transfer and 0.22 after it. The Lorenz curve plots the cumulative proportion of wealth as a function of the cumulative proportion of the population. Table 10 shows the calculation and the effect on the Lorenz curve of the transfer discussed in Table 9 . As before, Column 1 is the amount transferred. Column 2 is the proportion of the population in each wealth level. Columns 3 and 4 are the wealth levels before and after the transfer, respectively. Column 5 and 6 represent the proportion of wealth belonging to each type of agent before and after the transfer. The Lorenz curve corresponding to the case without the subsidy plots column 7 in the horizontal axis and column 8 in the vertical axis (the Lorenz curve corresponding to the economy with the subsidy is symmetrically defined using column 9). 
